|Title: Marital Transfer and Intrahousehold Allocation: A Nash-Bargaining Analysis|
|Reference Number: 1016|
|Publication Date: September 2000|
|JEL Classifcation: J12, D10|
| Author(s): |
Wing Suen, William Chan
The University of Hong Kong
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
This paper explores the implications of inter-generational marital transfers on the allocation of resources within a conjugal household. Adopting a Nash bargaining framework with alternative models of the threat points, it is argued that parents have greater incentive to make transfers to a married child because of the efficiency gains from joint consumption and production of family public good, and also because of the increase in bargaining power of the child in the allocation of private consumption. Such transfers also enhance marital stability by increasing the efficiency gains from marriage.
Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 52 (September 2003), pp.133-146.
Key words: dowry, intra-household allocation, inter-generational transfers
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