Abstract:
This paper examines an international Cournot duopoly wherein a home firm and a foreign firm compete in the home market under exchange rate uncertainty. The foreign exporting
firm, being risk averse, has incentives to hedge its exchange rate risk exposure. In a two-stage
setting, we show that hedging via an unbiased currency futures market acts as a strategic device. In particular, under either constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion, an increase in the hedging volume of the foreign firm promotes its exports and deters
the home firm's output. In contrast to the well-known full-hedging result in a perfectly competitive environment, we find that the foreign firm over-hedges for strategic reasons.
Furthermore, the separation result from the hedging literature under perfect competition no longer holds in our duopoly framework, i.e., equilibrium output levels depend on the risk attitude of the foreign firm as well as the probability distribution of the spot exchange rate. |
